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I. INTRODUCTION AND REFERENCES
A. Introduction
The future o f the Endangered Species Act (ESA) lately has come under intense scrutiny. 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. Probably the most intractable aspect o f the debate is the property 
rights issue. The Act has at least the potential to affect private property in various ways — 
whatever its actual impact may be. Its detractors call it absolutist in commmanding the 
protection o f every endangered species regardless o f private property impacts, while its 
partisans find in it ample accommodation o f landowners’ concerns.
To no one’s surprise, the more than 800 domestic species listed as endangered or 
threatened under the ESA are sometimes found on private land. When they are, the ESA 
may pit private economic activity against national concern for aesthetic, ecological, scientific, 
and recreational values. See ESA § 2(a)(3). The landowner may suffer direct economic loss, 
while the benefits reaped as a member o f the public are delayed, uncertain, and 
noneconomic. Moreover, if the land is not purchased by the government, the public enjoys 
the claimed benefits without cost.
Anecdotal accounts o f negative ESA impacts on private property abound, though there 
appears to be little hard documentation from neutral sources. A General Accounting Office 
report requested by the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and expected 
late summer, 1994, is slated to look at the issue. In the meantime, this outline concentrates 
more on the law than the disputed reality.
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Analyzing the property impacts o f the ESA in terms o f whether there exists a 
constitutional taking is the currently fashionable approach, but such impacts have also been 
challenged as due process violations, government torts, or exceedances o f the police power. 
Other federal wildlife statutes that have spawned property-related court challenges are the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Eagle Protection Act, and Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros 
Act.
B. References
Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and "Takings": A  Call for Innovation within the 
Terms o f  the Act, 24 ENVTL. L .___(1994) (issue no. 2).
Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: The Impact o f Section 9 on Private Landowners, 
24 E n v t l . L .___(1994) (issue no. 2).
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the Departments 
o f Interior and Commerce, 64 COLO. St . L. REV. 277 (1993)
Thomas Lambert and Robert J. Smith, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TIME FOR A 
CHANGE (Center for the Study o f American Business 1994)
Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 
24 Envtl. L .____ (1994) (issue no. 2).
II. A PROPERTY-RIGHTS TOUR OF THE ESA
A. Listing and critical habitat designation
The possibility o f private property impacts begins when the Secretary o f the Interior, 
through the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), lists a species as endangered or threatened. 
(The Secretary o f Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
administers the Act for marine species.) Listing is to be done "solely on the basis o f the best 
scientific and commercial data" — i.e., without reference to economic costs or private property 
impacts. ESA § 4(b)(1).
Along with listing, the FWS must designate critical habitat for the species when 
"prudent and determinable." ESA § 4(a)(3). Such designations are to be based both on
- 2 -
scientific data and "economic impact and any other relevant impact" -  plainly allowing 
property impacts to be weighed. ESA § 4(b)(2). This distinction between listing and habitat 
designation, allowing analyses o f property impacts only with the latter, was made by 
Congress quite deliberately. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1982).
B. Section 9: "takings" on private land
Section 9 bans, inter ali, the "taking" o f endangered animals and various commercial 
transactions involving them, with lesser protections for listed plants. It applies to actions 
anywhere -- on private land, public land, or waterways -  and regardless o f whether on 
designated critical habitat. By rule, the FWS has extended section 9’s prohibitions to 
threatened animals and plants. ESA § 4(d); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (wildlife), § 17.71 (plants).
The pivotal section-9 term "take" is defined to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, ...
capture, or collect" a listed animal. As discussed below, how broadly to read the "harm"
component o f this definition is key to the ESA/property rights issue.
Note: th e  "taking" o f  listed species is shown herein quotation marks;
the taking o f  private property under the Fifth Amendment is shown by 
absence o f  same.
Exceptions from section 9 to allow economic growth are authorized for "takings" 
incidental to otherwise lawful activity, allowing a project to go forward even if it harms some 
individuals o f a listed species. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B). Incidental "take" permits (popularly, 
"section 10 permits") are issued by FWS once the landowner submits a "habitat conservation 
plan."
C. Section 7: private development with federal nexus
Section 7 calls upon each federal agency to consult with FWS or NMFS to ensure that 
its actions are "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence o f any endangered species or 
threatened species, or result in the destruction or adverse modification o f " designated critical 
habitat. Thus, private development may be thwarted if a requisite federal permit cannot be
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issued consistently with section 7. Incidental "taking" o f species members may be allowed 
by FWS/NMFS if section 7 is nonetheless satisfied (popularly, a "no jeopardy" opinion).
As a last resort, a cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee ("God Squad") may allow 
certain federal agency actions to proceed despite a threat o f extinction.
III. SOME POSSIBLE TYPES OF ESA PRIVATE PROPERTY IMPACTS
A. Direct limits on land uses that might adversely affect listed species
1. ESA provisions
The FWS’ reading o f section 9’s "take" prohibition to embrace certain substantial 
habitat alterations is a key reason the ESA is in tension with private property interests. 
FWS’ reading comes about in two steps: (1) "take" is defined by the Act to include 
"harm," and (2) FWS defines "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife ...." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
Though early scholarly writing questioned the inclusion o f habitat modification per
se in the definition o f "harm," the matter was considered settled until recently because 
the only court rulings, in Palila v. Hawaii D ep’t o f  Land and Natural Resources, 
supported the FWS’ definition. 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (Palila I); 852 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II). On March 11, 1994, however, the D.C. Circuit rendered a 
contrary 2-1 ruling, holding that "harm" was intended by Congress to be confined to 
"direct application o f force to the animal taken" — which, in the court’s view, did not 
include habitat alteration. Sweet Home Chapter o f Communities for a Great Oregon v.
Babit, No. 92-5255, petition for reconsideration filed.
Sweet Home Chapter does not affect ESA section 7, hence there is no dispute that 
alteration o f designated critical habitat on private land remains subject to that section’s 
restrictions when there is a federal nexus. However, section 7 conflicts are found in 
only a small minority o f consultations, and in most instances can be resolved by
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alternative proposals or mitigation conditions. U.S. General Accounting Office, 
Endangered Species Act: Types and Number of Implementing Actions 31-32 
(GAO/RCED-92-131BR 1992). Pursuing an Endangered Species Committee exemption 
is a legal and realistic option only for the largest projects.
2. Babbitt initiatives
Under Secretary Babbitt, the Department of the Interior has been exploring how 
to make the existing ESA more flexible, where a species cannot be adequately protected 
by using federal land alone. Attention has focussed on more innovative use o f (1) 
section 10’s incidental "take" mechanism, underutilized in the past because o f the 
expense, complexity, and delay in negotiating the required habitat conservation plans 
(only 21 approved by FWS as o f early 1994), (2) section 4(d) "special rules" for 
threatened species, as a means o f incorporating new conflict-reducing techniques 
(density transfers, off-site mitigation, dedications) not practical in small-parcel 
incidental-"take" permits, and (3) section 6(c) federal-state cooperative agreements. 
e.g., Special Rule Concerning Take o f the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 
58 Fed. Reg. 65,088 (1993) (providing that an incidental taking o f species members does 
not violate section 9 if it results from activities consistent with California’s Natural 
Community Conservation Planning Act (NCCPA) and the NCCPA plan for protection 
o f coastal sage scrub habitat).
3. Case law
While direct land-use restrictions under the ESA spark impassioned debate, there 
have been no court rulings on such restrictions in ESA taking suits. Indeed, there are 
no such cases pending in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims (the trial court with 
jurisdiction). By contrast, another federal effort caught up in the property-rights
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debate, the wetlands protection program, had generated 28 takings filings in that court, 
as o f May, 1993, and 7 takings rulings in the past year.
What this dearth o f ESA cases means is disputed by environmentalists and 
property rights advocates. At the very least, one cannot infer that the ESA never 
causes significant adverse impact to private property, since the daunting demands of 
taking law discourage suit in all but extreme instances o f property value loss or project 
delay. For example, a taking action based on ESA restrictions would likely have to 
demonstrate roughly 90% fair market value loss, or near-total elimination o f economic 
use, determined with regard to the parcel as a whole. A temporary taking action would 
have to show that project delays had been "extraordinary" — which no federal court 
appears to have ever found. (Recent federal delay cases appear to have all arisen from 
wetlands regulation. See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 
1993).
Additionally, takings law imposes exacting ripeness requirements. Thus, mere 
listing cannot support a ripe taking claim. Rather, the landowner must first apply for 
and be denied an incidental "take" permit, then (unless futile) propose one or more 
scaled-down versions which also are barred. See United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, A ll 
U.S. 340 (1986).
And while there have been no decisions yet, there is ongoing taking litigation 
involving the ESA directly and indirectly, with intimations o f more to come. See, e.g., 
Four Points Utility Joint Venture v. United States, No. 93-655 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 22, 
1993) (plaintiffs allege that FWS and City o f Austin have effected taking by adopting 
policies, partly under ESA, to keep portion o f developer’s tract in its natural state); 
Boise Cascade v. State o f Oregon, No. 93-2018 (Ct. App. filed Feb. 1, 1993) (claiming
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that state logging prohibition on 56 acres surrounding nesting spotted owls, listed as 
threatened under state law, has effected taking).
ESA takings litigation conceivably may also arise from government measures to 
protect aquatic species, especially where such measures impinge on state-law water 
rights. The ESA provides no exception to persons holding such rights. United States 
v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992). For 
example, efforts to maintain instream flows to conserve listed species o f salmon found 
in the Columbia and Sacramento Rivers have been suggested by commentators to 
conflict with such rights.
Two recent takings decisions in the direct-limits category have arisen under state 
wildlife protection laws. Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 
1992) (finding no taking in state’s denial o f permit for development that would overlap 
protected "deeryard area"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993); Florida Game and Fresh 
Water Fish Comm’n v. Flotilla, Inc., No. 93-00554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1994) 
(discerning no taking when acreage in an ongoing subdivision development had to be 
left undisturbed for several years while occupied by a nesting pair o f bald eagles). 
These decisions suggest that the high-priority purpose o f the ESA to avert the 
extinction o f species will not prompt courts to place ESA-based property restrictions in 
categorical status, removed from the customary case-by-case approach to testing for 
takings.
B. Limits on defensive measures protecting private property from harm by listed 
species
1. Introduction
Limitations on one’s ability to protect property from the depredations o f certain 
animals are o f older vintage than the previous category. State hunting bans have long 
been attacked when protected birds or deer fed on private crops or forage. Under the
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ESA, debate usually involves protected predators (grizzly bears and wolves) that may 
kill private livestock.
2. ESA provisions
The ESA allows a defense to the "take" prohibition based on good-faith belief that 
one was protecting persons, but not property. ESA §§ 11(a)(3) (civil defense), 11(b)(3) 
(criminal defense). However, FWS "special rules" under section 4(d) allow government 
agents to "take" members o f threatened species and experimental populations that have 
actually harmed property. Two such special rules are for threatened grizzlies and 
experimental populations o f red wolves. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.40(b)(1)(c), 17.84(c)(5), 
respectively. By contrast, special rules are authorized for endangered species.
3. Case law
Most taking decisions under federal wildlife laws concern limits on defensive 
measures, not direct limits on land use. All such cases have ruled against the 
landowner. Prominent in the decisions is a refusal by courts to attribute the actions 
o f wild animals to the government, despite government’s role in limiting defenses and 
even when such animals are managed by government. This government 
nonresponsibility is an extension o f the common law doctrine o f ferae naturae, under
which no person is liable for injuries by animals in a state o f nature, until they are 
reduced to possession by skillful capture. See Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616, 
618 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 949 (1950); Rubinstein v. United States, 338 
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
In the only ESA case in this category, a rancher shot a grizzly bear menacing his 
sheep, after losing many sheep to bears. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). He was administratively assessed a civil 
penalty o f $2,500 for his "take" o f a threatened species member. The court found no
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regulatory taking o f Christy’s sheep because, in its view, the FWS’ regulations left him 
with a complete bundle o f property rights in them. The court found no physical taking 
o f the sheep because the United States neither owns nor controls the wildlife it 
protects; the rancher’s loss is merely the "incidental result" o f reasonable regulation. 
In lone dissent from the denial o f certiorari, Justice White asked whether "a 
Government edict barring one from resisting the loss o f one’s property is the 
constitutional equivalent o f an edict taking such property in the first place." 490 U.S. 
at 1115-16.
Non-ESA depredation cases in the federal courts all have reached the same no­
taking holding as Christy. Mountain States Legal Found, v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 
1430-31 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. deni, 480 U.S. 851 (1987) (horses protected under Wild 
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act consumed private forage for livestock); Fallini v. 
United States, No. 92-809 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 4, 1994) (water sources on federal land, used 
for watering livestock under federal permits, had to be shared with WFHBA-protected 
horses); United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 848 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 980 (1988) (compelled removal o f fence on private land, leading to competition 
for private forage between rancher’s cattle and pronghorn antelope); Bishop v. United 
States, 126 F. Supp. 449 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (geese protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act damaged private crops), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 955 (1955).
Most state court decisions, typically involving hunting bans on game animals, also 
deny compensation to the landowner. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 220 N.Y. 423,116 N.E. 
99 (1917) (government-reintroduced beavers destroyed trees on valuable private 
woodland); Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1981) (goose hunting ban 
inflated goose population, causing crop losses).
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Perhaps the most compelling case for a taking through restrictions on property 
defenses occurs when protected animals are introduced, or reintroduced, into an area 
by the government. Here, the Christy argument that wild animals are not
"instrumentalities o f the government" seems most open to challenge. Christy expressly 
left this issue open. 857 F.2d at 1335 n.9. The two known cases in the area, involving 
reintroduction into the animals’ historic range, have gone for the government. Barrett 
v. State, supra; Moerman v. State, 17 Cal. App. 4th 452, 21 Cal. Rptr. 329 (no taking by 
state-relocated Tule elk that allegedly occupied plaintiff's ranch almost continuously, 
ate crops raised for rancher’s livestock, and damaged fences), review denied, No. 
S034811 (Cal. S. Ct. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994). 
Notwithstanding, conservative legal foundations are looking for cases to file.
Depredation cases also have invoked due process and tort theories, again 
unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, supra (no fundamental due-process right in 
U.S. Constitution to protect livestock from protected predators that would subject ESA 
to strict scrutiny); Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950) (United 
States not responsible for waterfowl’s feeding on private crops merely because of 
protection afforded such birds under Migratory Bird Treaty Act), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 
939 (1951). With regard to due process, note that state cases, in contrast with federal 
cases, have recognized a state constitutional right to defend one’s property from wild 
animals even when contrary to state conservation laws. See, e.g., Cross v. State, 370 
P.2d 371,376-77 (Wyo. 1962) (due process clause in state constitution read to guarantee 
"the inherent and inalienable right to protect property").
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C. Post-listing limits on commercial dealing in species members acquired prior to 
listing
1. ESA provisions
Section 9 includes many provisions that bar commercial dealings in endangered 
species (by rule, extended to threatened species), but no general grandfather clause for 
species members and items made therefrom acquired prior to listing. There is only a 
limited exemption available to persons who have entered into a contract before the 
species was considered for listing, if they otherwise would suffer "undue economic 
hardship." ESA § 10(b).
2. Case law
The second o f the two reported ESA/taking cases falls into this category. In United 
States v. Kepler, 537 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976), no taking was discerned in the ESA’s ban 
on interstate transport o f listed animals that were allegedly held lawfully as o f the 
ESA’s enactment. The court reasoned that the ESA barred sales o f the listed animals 
only in interstate and foreign commerce, allowing sales in intrastate commerce and 
possibly for scientific and species propagation purposes. Thus, listing did not 
completely destroy the value o f the animals.
This category also includes a Supreme Court ruling: Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 
(1979). Allard addressed the Eagle Protection Act and Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 
banning commercial transactions in bird parts even if they were acquired pre-ban. The 
Court saw no taking o f plaintiff’s Indian artifacts made from eagle feathers, explaining 
that while the ban foreclosed the most profitable use o f the artifacts (commercial sale), 
other uses, including possession, transport, donation, or exhibition for an admission 
charge, remained open to plaintiffs. This holding was cited in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council as illustrating that government control over commercial dealings in
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personal property, as opposed to land, can rarely be a taking. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-00 
(1992).
In light o f Andrus and Lucas, future successful taking actions in this category 
would seem unlikely.
D. Miscellaneous impacts
Other theoretical types o f private property impacts from the ESA include 
expenditures voluntarily made by landowners to dispute FWS claims as to the presence 
o f an endangered species, banks unwilling to make construction loans until assured that 
protected species are not present, trespasses by members o f the public curious to 
observe a newly listed species, etc. For many o f these impacts, however, it is unlikely 
that liability, if any, would attach to the United States.
HI. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
A. Physical taking or land-use regulation?
Taking plaintiffs would benefit greatly if courts were to view wildlife protection laws 
as bringing about a government-caused permanent physical occupation o f land by members 
of the protected species, or a government-caused appropriation o f consumed livestock or 
forage. So characterized, many ESA impacts would constitute a per se taking. Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
But if ESA strictures are viewed as land-use regulation, takings law raises difficult and 
complex evidentiary barriers that each plaintiff must relitigate anew -  in particular, proving 
total or near-total reduction in the value o f a parcel viewed as a whole. One suspects that 
in the overwhelming majority o f ESA cases, such a showing cannot be made, since non-"take'' 
economic uses o f the property will remain. Most courts wrestling with takings challenges 
to federal wildlife statutes have adopted the land-use regulation label. See, e.g., Mountain 
States, 799 F.2d at 1428.
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B. Government’s non-ownership of wildlife, but special relation thereto
Government does not own the wildlife within its borders. Rather, the ownership 
language once used by the Supreme Court has been called by that Court a legal fiction 
reflecting the state’s broad power to regulate wildlife in the public interest. Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334-35 (1979). Federal wildlife cases infer from the absence of 
traditional ownership, the absence o f government control, and the doctrine o f ferae naturae 
that government is not accountable for the acts o f wildlife. Caveat: the nonaccountability 
argument, as noted, is weaker in the case o f government-introduced animals.
In the ESA, Congress has elevated government’s long-recognized interest in managing 
wildlife for the public good to "the highest o f priorities." TVA v. H ill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 
(1978). Notwithstanding, the few pertinent federal cases suggest that regulation to protect 
wildlife — even to avert extinction — will be evaluated for takings under the same standards 
as other government action. Lucas appears to endorse this view. There, the Court 
specifically noted conservation o f endangered species habitat as a governmental purpose 
easily characterized as both prevention o f public harm (traditionally held to be 
noncompensable) and creration o f public benefit (often held compensable) -- in the course 
o f debunking the harm-bebnefit distinction generally. 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.11. In addition, 
Lucas is explicit that its rule o f per se compensability for "total takings" — complete 
elimination o f a parcel’s economic uses -- applies regardless o f the public interest advanced 
as justification for the restraint. Id. at 2893.
Another facet o f Lucas, however, opens the door for new wildlife protective elements 
to enter the takings analysis. Lucas pronounced that total takings are not compensable 
when the landowner’s plans are inconsistent with "background principles o f the State’s law 
o f property and nuisance" existing when the property was acquired. This exemption from 
compensability cannot logically be confined to state "background principles" (as opposed to
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federal ones), to total takings (as opposed to partial ones), or to regulatory takings (as 
opposed to physical ones). Under this broad view o f "background principles," the historical 
involvement o f states in wildlife protection, and indeed perhaps the ESA itself, may stand 
as an obstacle to the taking plaintiff. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t o f Forestry, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
338, 21 Cal. App. 4th 603 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting in dictum that "wildlife regulation o f some 
sort has been historically a part o f the pre-existing law o f property," and hence seems to 
qualify as a Lucas background principle).
While the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims might eventually accept some wildlife laws as 
Lucas background principles, it may be speculated that the court will not condone extension 
o f the public trust doctrine to federal protection o f wildlife, at least to the extent that 
wildlife protection is thereby made categorically noncompensable.
C. Requirements for affirmative action or expense by landowner
As long as the ESA asks the property owner to address only a harm that his own 
activity would create, it should make little difference to the takings analysis whether the 
impact is prohibitory or mandatory. Affirmative requirements under the ESA may take the 
form of land dedication and mitigation requirements contained in HCPs. See, e.g., 
population monitoring and habitat enhancement requirements in San Bruno Mountain Area 
Habitat Conservation Plan. In one case, use o f "turtle excluder devices" in the nets of 
shrimp fishermen was attacked as a taking. Concerned Shrimpers o f  America, Inc. v. 
Mosbacher, No. CA C-90-39 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 1990) (dismissed for lack o f jurisdiction).
Takings law requires that the burden on the landowner, whether prohibitory or 
mandatory, be proportional to the harm that his proposed action might have — a 
relationship that may soon be given more precise definition by the Supreme Court in Dolan 
v. City o f Tigard (No. 93-518, orally argued March 23, 1994).
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D. Benefits to the property owner from the ESA
The discovery o f a listed species on or near private land conceivably may yield benefits 
for the owner (beyond those enjoyed as a member o f the general public) as well as burdens. 
For example, one brochure promoting the sale o f homes in a self-described environmentally 
sensitive development extols the presence there o f several endangered species o f birds. Such 
positive impacts, assuming they occur, are plainly relevant to the Fifth Amendment analysis.
E. Supreme Court endorsement of wildlife protection generally
In recent decades, the High Court has consistently embraced wildlife protective 
arguments in construing federal protection statutes. In addition to Andrus v. 
see Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 
(1976), and especially TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (interpreting ESA). At a minimum, 
these decisions indicate that the Court accepts wildlife protection as a legitimate 
governmental objective that can support reasonable interference with property rights.
IV. LEGISLATIVE ASPECTS 
A. General
Congress is almost certain not to reauthorize the ESA this year, for two reasons. First, 
the Administration has sought time to see how Secretary Babbitt’s effort to better 
accommodate economic pressures under existing ESA mechanisms will play out. Second, the 
ESA’s partisans fear that reauthorization would open up the Act to property-rights 
amendments. House deliberations during October, 1993, on creation o f a National Biological 
Survey, resulting in adoption of several property-rights amendments, are viewed as 
foreshadowing a property-rights melee if the ESA is brought up soon.
One must understand that the property rights issue, on the Hill and elsewhere, reaches 
far beyond constitutional takings. Because taking actions can be costly and difficult to win, 
some members appear to take little comfort from the open door o f the U.S. Court o f Federal
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Claims. Rather, they seek to prevent property impacts from occurring in the first place 
("assessment bills"). Where impacts do occur, some members seek a standard of 
compensation more liberal than that in the Takings Clause ("compensation bills").
B. Specific legislation
H.R. 2043 and S. 921, introduced by the relevant committee chairmen, would address 
the ESA concerns o f landowners through relatively minor programmatic adjustments — by 
allowing landowners to learn in advance whether a proposed activity would be a "taking," 
authorizing HCPs for candidate species (so that post-HCP listings do not change the ground 
rules for the landowner), and compensating landowners for non-mandatory private 
conservation measures.
A competing pair o f ESA-amendment bills, H.R. 1490 (Rep. Tauzin) and S. 1521 (Sen. 
Shelby) would address property rights more aggressively by, inter alia ,  giving property 
owners a statutory right to compensation when final actions under the ESA substantially 
eliminate the economically viable use o f property. The same members have also introduced 
a "Private Property Owners Bill o f Rights" (H.R. 3875, S. 1915), applicable solely to the ESA 
and wetlands program, that sets a value loss o f "50 percent or more o f the fair market value 
... o f the affected portion o f the property" as a trigger for compensation.
V. SUMMARY
Legal and ethical duties to endangered species are novel and not universally accepted. 
The ESA forces a "seminal rethinking" in both areas. See Holmes Rolston III, Property 
Rights and Endangered Species, 6 1  U. Colo. L. Rev. 283 (1990). One can reasonably expect, 
however, that the great majority o f ESA impacts will be constitutionally noncompensable - 
- for the reasons above. The only solid prospect for compensability may be in narrow, special 
circumstances — for example, if extensive property damage were to be caused by government-
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introduced and -managed animals against which no adequate landowner defense was 
allowed.
Plainly, however, there are imponderables. The courts may qualify the "parcel as a 
whole" rule o f taking law, at least in its more exotic applications (such as to noncontiguous 
parcels owned by plaintiff). The Supreme Court might resolve Dolan v. City o f Tigard in 
a way that heightens judicial scrutiny o f dedications and mitigation conditions in HCPs. 
And the takings jurisprudence o f the Federal Circuit (to which ESA taking actions against 
the United States would be appealed) may continue to evolve in a plaintiff-friendly direction. 
See most recently, Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, No. 91-5156 (Mar. 10,1994) 
(suggesting that distinct "interests" in a parcel should be analyzed separately in determining 
whether a regulatory taking occurred).
In any event, a broad response to the property rights issue from the political branches 
is preferable to sole reliance on the courts, given the expense and unpredictability o f takings 
litigation and the perception o f some observers that the Act could achieve its goals with 
greater accommodation o f landowner aspirations.
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